Une harmonie en arrière

International audienceLes idées simples ont la vie dure en philosophie. Bergson philosophe de l'élan vital, certes. Mais qui se souvient que l'élan est fini ? Qui se souvient que cette force métaphysique n'est cause des effets qu'elle produit qu'en prenant " corps avec ceux-ci " et en étant " déterminé par eux autant qu'elle les détermine " . Drôle de force métaphysique en vérité. Peut-on dire que l'élan vital est une force immanente, et qu'il s'oppose ainsi à l'idée d'un Dieu transcendant ? Mais que veut dire le mot " immanent " ? Si l'on s'en tient à l'un de ses plus fameux usages, il est lié chez Spinoza à l'idée de substance divine, qui est " en soi " et " conçue par soi ", substance dont la proposition 11 du Livre I de l'Ethique atteste qu'elle est également " cause de soi ". Son essence enveloppe donc son existence, propriété justement essentielle qui la définit comme force auto-déterminante. Comment donc cette substance, cause immanente de tous les modes qui suivent de la seule nécessité de sa nature par la médiation de l'entendement divin, pourrait-elle être l'effet des effets qu'elle produit ? Dire que l'élan est fini, c'est dire qu'il est lui-même causé par quelque chose, c'est dire que son essence ne précède donc pas son existence, existence qui ne suit pas de cette dernière comme un simple prédicat de sa substance

From Power to Biopower

International audienceThe concept of " power " plays an important role in Michel Foucault's critic of the classical model of sovereignty. This paper shows how "power" is related to "normalisation" in Surveiller et punir and in La volonté de savoir. Power is not only the way by which somebody acts on the action of somebody, but also a systemic property emerging in a social network. It emerges as a collective strategy, without any strategist, and without any subject. One could call this a "constructive" property. However, "biopower" is not simply "power". It is an "extension" of it. In La volonté de Savoir, Foucault tries to understand how biopower will organise a human social network, in which biological constraints are "reflected" by political ones. Human species is not simply the expression of a natural kind, but also the result of a social and of a political construction. This paper analyses this important change in Foucault's philosophy of power

Extended physics as theoretical framework for system biology?

International audienceIn this essay we examine whether a theoretical and conceptual framework for systems biology could be built from the Bailly-Longo (2008-9) proposal. These authors aim to understand life as a coherent critical structure, and propose to develop an extended physical approach of evolution, as a diffusion of biomass in a space of complexity. Their attempt leads to a simple mathematical reconstruction of Gould's assumption (1989) concerning the bacterial world as a "left wall of least complexity" that we will examine. Extended physical systems are characterized by their constructive properties. Time is acting and new properties emerge by their history that can open the list of their initial properties. This conceptual and theoretical framework is nothing more than a philosophical assumption, but as such it provides a new and exciting approach concerning the evolution of life, and the transition between physics and biology

Considérations épistémologiques sur les cercles vicieux épigénétiques du vieillissement

National audienceAging is not a disease. Age changes occur in every adult animal. It takes place in all species. Yet, malign tumours, and neurodegenerative diseases are growing with age. Nobody dies from aging. Death results from age-associated diseases. Muscular and digestive atrophies are rising with age. But can we say that digestive atrophy lead to a bad nutrition, or is it not the contrary? Where is the chicken and where is the egg? We are closed in a vicious circle. A vicious circle is not a simple cycle. It's an irreversible phenomenon that happens when a system of objects is acting on itself. Vicious circles are coming too at the molecular level. This paper tries to show that the destruction of elastin and of fibronectine in connective tissues produces a self destruction effect. Von Neumann showed that we can imagine a model of self reproduction with the help of reproductive automata. We attempts to show that nature has imagined a model to produce self destruction, with the use of degradation of fibronectin and elastin in peptides. This self destruction process is neither purely stochastic, nor genetically programmed. It's an epigenetical process. It's not present at the beginning, like an a priori instruction, it is emerging. Then we try to give a specific unusual philosophical definition to the word "emergence.

Ist die Bergson’sche Kritik an der Messbarkeit von Gefühlen heute immer noch aktuell?

This paper attempts to show how the Bergsonian method works in philosophy on a concrete problem: how is it possible to measure sensations? Bergson explains that a sensation is not a psychological object, since what it is depends on what is, is doing to us. Then it is not only represented. It is lived. All sensation measuring is adding a new feeling (a feeling of growth of intensity, for instance) to what is measured (a growth of intensity.) This specific feeling is in connection with nothing but duration. The first aim is to show that this old epistemological problem is still attractive today. We don’t know exactly how to measure sensations neither with additive nor with ordinal measuring. But we want to explain also how the metaphysical intuition is working in the first Bergson’s book. It is not coming first. It is always coming after the examination of a specific scientific problem, since the philosophical insight is always emerging in an indirect way. It is impossible then to assert with Bergson that science is not thinking. It is just important to observe that science is not thinking alone. It needs the critical action of philosophy.Cet article essaie de montrer la maničre dont la méthode bergsonienne fonctionne sur un problčme concret: comment est-il possible de mesurer les sensations? Bergson explique qu’une sensation n’est pas un objet psychologique, puisque ce qu’elle est dépend de ce qu’elle nous fait. Alors elle n’est pas seulement représentée. Elle est vécue. Toute mesure des sensations ajoute un sentiment nouveau (celui d’accroissement d’intensité, par exemple) ŕ ce qui est mesuré (un accroissement d’intensité). Ce sentiment spécifique n’est lié qu’ŕ la durée. Le premier objectif est de montrer que ce vieux problčme épistémologique est toujours attrayant. Nous ne savons pas exactement comment mesurer les sensations, ni par une mesure additive, ni par une mesure ordinale. Mais nous voulons expliquer aussi comment l’intuition métaphysique fonctionne dans le premier livre de Bergson. Elle ne passe pas en premier. Elle vient toujours aprčs l’examen d’un problčme scientifique spécifique, car l’idée philosophique émerge toujours d’une maničre indirecte. Il est impossible alors d’affirmer avec Bergson que la science ne pense pas. Il importe juste de noter que la science ne pense pas seule. Elle a besoin de l’action critique de la philosophie.Im Folgenden wird versucht zu erläutern, wie die Bergson’sche Methode an einem konkreten Problem in der Philosophie funktioniert: Wie ist es möglich, Gefühle zu messen? Bergson erklärt, dass ein Gefühl kein psychologisches Objekt ist, da das, was es ist, davon abhängt, wie es auf uns wirkt. Dann ist es nicht nur vorgestellt, sondern auch gelebt. Jede Gefühlsmessung fügt dem Gemessenen (Intensitätssteigerung) ein neues Gefühl hinzu (beispielsweise das Gefühl der Intensitätssteigerung). Dieses spezifische Gefühl steht mit nichts anderem als der Dauer in Verbindung. Unser erstes Ziel ist es aufzuweisen, dass dieses alte epistemologische Problem auch heute noch attraktiv ist. Wir wissen nicht genau, wie wir Gefühle messen sollten, sei es mit zusätzlichen oder mit regulären Messvorgängen.Wir möchten jedoch auch erklären, wie metaphysische Intuition in Bergsons erstem Werk funktioniert. Sie kommt nicht zuerst. Sie erfolgt immer nach der Überprüfung eines spezifischen wissenschaftlichen Problems, da philosophische Einsichten immer mittelbar entstehen. Es ist unmöglich, Bergsons Auffassung zu teilen, dass Wissenschaft nicht denke. Wichtig ist nur zu bemerken, dass Wissenschaft nicht alleine denkt. Sie bedarf der kritischen Aktion der Philosophie

Note sur La Structure des révolutions scientifiques de Thomas Kuhn

Notre réflexion montre l’importance de deux énoncés fondamentaux pour comprendre la réflexion de Kuhn. Tout d’abord, une théorie scientifique n’a pas véritablement de structure au sens où l’entend Ernst Nagel, car elle constitue plutôt ce qu’il nomme « une matrice disciplinaire ». Ensuite, s’il y a bien une « structure » des révolutions scientifiques, cela n’indique en rien que celles-ci sont nécessaires au sens logique, mais plutôt que l’on ne peut que rétrospectivement trouver des « raisons » qui justifient leur émergence.This article demonstrates the importance of two fundamental statements in understanding Kuhn’s thought. Firstly, a scientific theory doesn’t have a real structure as defined by Ernest Nagel, for it constitutes rather what Kuhn calls a “disciplinary matrix”. Secondly, though there is indeed a “structure” to scientific revolutions, this doesn’t mean that revolutions are logically necessary, but rather that any “reasons” which might explain their emergence can only be found retrospectively

On physicalism and downward causation in developmental and cancer biology

International audienceThe dominant position in Philosophy of Science contends that downward causation is an illusion. Instead, we argue that downward causation doesn't introduce vicious circles either in physics or in biology. We also question the metaphysical claim that "physical facts fix all the facts." Downward causation does not imply any contradiction if we reject the assumption of the completeness and the causal closure of the physical world that this assertion contains. We provide an argument for rejecting this assumption. Furthermore, this allows us to reconsider the concept of diachronic emergence

Symmetry breaking and functional incompleteness in biological systems

Symmetry-based explanations using symmetry breaking (SB) as the key explanatory tool have complemented and replaced traditional causal explanations in various domains of physics. The process of spontaneous SB is now a mainstay of contemporary explanatory accounts of large chunks of condensed-matter physics, quantum field theory, nonlinear dynamics, cosmology, and other disciplines. A wide range of empirical research into various phenomena related to symmetries and SB across biological scales has accumulated as well. Led by these results, we identify and explain some common features of the emergence, propagation, and cascading of SB-induced layers across the biosphere. These features are predicated on the thermodynamic openness and intrinsic functional incompleteness of the systems at stake and have not been systematically analyzed from a general philosophical and methodological perspective. We also consider possible continuity of SB across the physical and biological world and discuss the connection between Darwinism and SB-based analysis of the biosphere and its history

Symmetry breaking and functional incompleteness in biological systems

Symmetry-based explanations using symmetry breaking (SB) as the key explanatory tool have complemented and replaced traditional causal explanations in various domains of physics. The process of spontaneous SB is now a mainstay of contemporary explanatory accounts of large chunks of condensed-matter physics, quantum field theory, nonlinear dynamics, cosmology, and other disciplines. A wide range of empirical research into various phenomena related to symmetries and SB across biological scales has accumulated as well. Led by these results, we identify and explain some common features of the emergence, propagation, and cascading of SB-induced layers across the biosphere. These features are predicated on the thermodynamic openness and intrinsic functional incompleteness of the systems at stake and have not been systematically analyzed from a general philosophical and methodological perspective. We also consider possible continuity of SB across the physical and biological world and discuss the connection between Darwinism and SB-based analysis of the biosphere and its history